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Abstract
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay
auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions.
First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel,
one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from
2 [23] to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of
the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi-
unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular valuations, the mechanism admits a
unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash equilibrium. The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all
the known bounds on the price of anarchy of mechanisms used for multi-unit auctions. Finally,
we analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to contests and show tight
bounds on the price of anarchy of social welfare, revenue and maximum bid.
1 Introduction
It is a common economic phenomenon in competitions that agents make irreversible investments
without knowing the outcome. All-pay auctions are widely used in economics to capture such
situations, where all players, even the losers, pay their bids. For example, a lobbyist can make
a monetary contribution in order to influence decisions made by the government. Usually the
group invested the most increases their winning chances, but all groups have to pay regardless
of the outcome. In addition, all-pay auctions have been shown useful to model rent seeking,
political campaigns and R&D races. There is a well-known connection between all-pay auctions
and contests [21]. In particular, the all-pay auction can be viewed as a single-prize contest, where
the payments correspond to the effort that players make in order to win the competition.
In this paper, we study the efficiency of mixed Nash equilibria in all-pay auctions with complete
information, from a worst-case analysis perspective, using the price of anarchy [16] as a measure.
As social objective, we consider the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the bidders’ valuations. We study
the equilibria induced from all-pay mechanisms in three fundamental resource allocation scenarios;
combinatorial auctions, multi-unit auctions and single-item auctions.
In a combinatorial auction a set of items are allocated to a group of selfish individuals. Each
player has different preferences for different subsets of the items and this is expressed via a valuation
set function. A multi-unit auction can be considered as an important special case, where there are
multiple copies of a single good. Hence the valuations of the players are not set functions, but
depend only on the number of copies received. Multi-unit auctions have been extensively studied
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since the seminal work by Vickrey [24]. As already mentioned, all-pay auctions have received a
lot of attention for the case of a single item, as they model all-pay contests and procurements via
contests.
1.1 Contribution
Combinatorial Auctions. Our first result is on the price of anarchy of simultaneous all-pay auctions
with item-bidding that was previously studied by Syrgkanis and Tardos [23]. For fractionally
subadditive valuations, it was previously shown that the price of anarchy was at most 2 [23] and at
least e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 [8]. We narrow further this gap, by improving the upper bound to 1.82. In
order to obtain the bound, we come up with several structural theorems that characterize mixed
Nash equilibria in simultaneous all-pay auctions.
Multi-unit Auctions. Our next result shows a novel use of all-pay mechanisms to the multi-unit
setting. We propose an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule inspired by Kelly’s
seminal proportional-share allocation mechanism [15]. We show that this mechanism admits a
unique, 75% efficient pure Nash equilibrium and no other mixed Nash equilibria exist, when bidders’
valuations are submodular. As a consequence, the price of anarchy of our mechanism outperforms all
current price of anarchy bounds of prevalent multi-unit auctions including uniform price auction [18]
and discriminatory auction [9], where the bound is e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58.
Single-item Auctions. Finally, we study the efficiency of a single-prize contest that can be modeled
as a single-item all-pay auction. We show a tight bound on the price of anarchy for mixed equi-
libria which is approximately 1.185. By following previous study on the procurement via contest,
we further study two other standard objectives, revenue and maximum bid. We evaluate the per-
formance of all-pay auctions in the prior-free setting, i.e. no distribution over bidders’ valuation is
assumed. We show that both the revenue and the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium are
at least as high as v2/2, where v2 is the second highest valuation. In contrast, the revenue and the
maximum bid in some mixed Nash equilibrium may be less than v2/2 when using reward structure
other than allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder. This result coincides with the opti-
mal crowdsourcing contest developed in [6] for the setting with prior distributions. We also show
that in conventional procurements (modeled by first-price auctions), v2 is exactly the revenue and
maximum bid in the worst equilibrium. So procurement via all-pay contests is a 2-approximation
to the conventional procurement in the context of worst-case equilibria.
1.2 Related work
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria in auctions has been a well-known fact (see e.g. [17]). Existence
of efficient equilibria of simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information settings was first studied
by Bikhchandani [3]. Christodoulou, Kova´cs and Schapira [7] initiated the study of the (Bayesian)
price of anarchy of simultaneous auctions with item-bidding. Several variants have been studied
since then [2, 13, 12], as well as multi-unit auctions [9, 18].
Syrgkanis and Tardos [23] proposed a general smoothness framework for several types of mech-
anisms and applied it to settings with fractionally subadditive bidders obtaining several upper
bounds (e.g., first price auction, all-pay auction, and multi-unit auction). Christodoulou et al. [8]
constructed tight lower bounds for first-price auctions and showed a tight price of anarchy bound of
2 for all-pay auctions with subadditive valuations. Roughgarden [20] presented an elegant method-
ology to provide price of anarchy lower bounds via a reduction from the hardness of the underlying
optimization problems.
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All-pay auctions and contests have been studied extensively in economic theory. Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries [1], fully characterized the Nash equilibria in single-item all-pay auction with complete
information. The connection between all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests was proposed in
[10]. Chawla et al. [6] studied the design of optimal crowdsourcing contest to optimize the maximum
bid in all-pay auctions when agents’ value are drawn from a specific distribution independently.
2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete on m items. Every player (or bidder) i ∈ [n] has a
valuation function vi : {0, 1}m → R+ which is monotone and normalized, that is, ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m],
vi(S) ≤ vi(T ), and vi(∅) = 0. The outcome of the auction is represented by a tuple of (X,p) where
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) specifies the allocation of items (Xi is the set of items allocated to player i) and
p = (p1, . . . , pn) specifies the buyers’ payments (pi is the payment of player i for the allocation
X). In the simultaneous item-bidding auction, every player i ∈ [n] submits a non-negative bid bij
for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent auctions, i.e. the allocation
and payment rule for item j only depend on the players’ bids on item j. In a simultaneous all-pay
auction the allocation and payment for each player is determined as follows: each item j ∈ [m] is
allocated to the bidder i∗ with the highest bid for that item, i.e. i∗ = arg maxi bij , and each bidder
i is charged an amount equal to pi =
∑
j∈[m] bij . It is worth mentioning that, for any bidder profile,
there always exists a tie-breaking rule such that mixed equilibria exist [22].
Definition 2.1 (Valuations). Let v : 2[m] → R be a valuation function. Then v is called a) additive,
if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}); b) submodular, if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ); c) fractionally
subadditive or XOS, if v is determined by a finite set of additive valuations ξk such that v(S) =
maxk ξk(S).
The classes of the above valuations are in increasing order of inclusion.
Multi-unit Auction. In a multi-unit auction, m copies of an item are sold to n bidders. Here,
bidder i ’s valuation is a function that depends on the number of copies he gets. That is vi :
{0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+ and it is non-decreasing and normalized, with vi(0) = 0. We say a valuation vi
is submodular, if it has non-increasing marginal values, i.e. vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ vi(t+ 1)− vi(t) for
all s ≤ t.
Nash equilibrium and price of anarchy. We use bi to denote a pure strategy of player i which might
be a single value or a vector, depending on the auction. So, for the case of m simultaneous auctions,
bi = (bi1, . . . , bim). We denote by b−i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn) the strategies of all players except
for i. Any mixed strategy Bi of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies.
For any profile of strategies, b = (b1, . . . , bn), X(b) denotes the allocation under the strategy
profile b. The valuation of player i for the allocation X(b) is denoted by vi(X(b)) = vi(b). The
utility ui of player i is defined as the difference between her valuation and payment: ui(X(b)) =
ui(b) = vi(b)− pi(b).
Definition 2.2 (Nash equilibria). A bidding profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) forms a pure Nash equilibrium
if for every player i and all bids b′i, ui(b) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i). Similarly, a mixed bidding profile B = ×iBi
is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for all bids b′i and every player i, Eb∼B[ui(b)] ≥ Eb−i∼B−i [ui(b′i,b−i)].
Clearly, any pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Our global objective is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players for their received al-
locations, i.e., to maximize the social welfare SW (X) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi). So O(v) = O = (O1, . . . , On)
is an optimal allocation if SW (O) = maxX SW (X). In Sect. 5, we also study two other objectives:
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the revenue, which equals the sum of the payments,
∑
i pi, and the maximum payment, maxi bi.
We also refer to the maximum payment as the maximum bid.
Definition 2.3 (Price of anarchy). Let I([n], [m],v) be the set of all instances, i.e. I([n], [m],v)
includes the instances for every set of bidders and items and any possible valuation functions. The
mixed price of anarchy, PoA, of a mechanism is defined as
PoA = max
I∈I
max
B∈E(I)
SW (O)
Eb∼B[SW (X(b))]
,
where E(I) is the class of mixed Nash equilibria for the instance I ∈ I. The pure PoA is defined
as above but restricted in the class of pure Nash equilibria.
Let B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given the profile B, we fix the notation
for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): Gij is the CDF of the bid of player i
for item j; Fj is the CDF of the highest bid for item j and Fij is the CDF of the highest bid for
item j if we exclude the bid of player i. Observe that Fj =
∏
kGkj and Fij =
∏
k 6=iGkj . We also
use ϕij(x) to denote the probability that player i gets item j by bidding x. Then, ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x).
When we refer to a single item, we may drop the index j. Whenever it is clear from the context,
we will use shorter notation for expectations, e.g. we use E[ui(b)] instead of Eb∼B[ui(b)], or even
SW (B) to denote Eb∼B[SW (X(b))].
3 Combinatorial Auctions
In this section we prove an upper bound of 1.82 for the mixed price of anarchy of simultaneous
all-pay auctions when bidders’ valuations are fractionally subadditive (XOS). This result improves
over the previously known bound of 2 due to [23]. We first state our main theorem and present the
key ingredients. Then we prove these ingredients in the following subsections.
Theorem 3.1. The mixed price of anarchy for simultaneous all-pay auctions with fractionally
subadditive (XOS) bidders is at most 1.82.
Proof. Given a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn), let O = (O1, . . . , On) be a fixed optimal solution,
that maximizes the social welfare. We can safely assume that O is a partition of the items. Since
vi is an XOS valuation, let ξ
Oi
i be a maximizing additive function with respect to Oi. For every
item j we denote by oj item j’s contribution to the optimal social welfare, that is, oj = ξ
Oi
i (j),
where i is such that j ∈ Oi. The optimal social welfare is thus SW (O) =
∑
j oj . In order to bound
the price of anarchy, we consider only items with oj > 0, as it is without loss of generality to omit
items with oj = 0.
For a fixed mixed Nash equilibrium B, recall that by Fj and Fij we denote the CDFs of the
maximum bid on item j among all bidders, with and without the bid of bidder i, respectively. For
any item j ∈ Oi, let Aj = maxx≥0 {Fij(x)oj − x}.
As a key part of the proof we use the following two inequalities that bound from below the
social welfare in any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
, (1)
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx . (2)
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Inequality (1) suffices to provide a weaker upper bound of 2 (see [8]). The proof of (2) is much
more involved, and requires a deeper understanding of the equilibria properties of the induced
game. We postpone their proofs in Sect. 3.1 (Lemma 3.2) and Sect. 3.2 (Lemma 3.3), respectively.
By combining (1) and (2),
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
·
∑
j
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(
1− Fj(x) + λ ·
√
Fj(x)
)
dx
)
, (3)
for every λ ≥ 0. It suffices to bound from below the right-hand side of (3) with respect to the
optimal social welfare. For any cumulative distribution function F , and any positive real number
v, let
R(F, v)
def
= A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx ,
whereA = maxx≥0{F (x)·v−x}. Inequality (3) can then be rewritten as SW (B) ≥ 11+λ
∑
j R(Fj , oj).
Finally, we show a lower bound of R(F, v) that holds for any CDF F and any positive real v.
R(F, v) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6
· v . (4)
The proof of (4) is given in Sect. 3.3 (Lemma 3.19). Finally, we obtain that for any λ > 0,
SW (B) ≥ 1
1 + λ
∑
j
R(Fj , oj) ≥ 3 + 4λ− λ
4
6λ+ 6
·
∑
j
oj =
3 + 4λ− λ4
6λ+ 6
· SW (O) .
By taking λ = 0.56, we conclude that the price of anarchy is at most 1.82.
3.1 Proof of Inequality (1)
This section is devoted to the proof of the following lower bound. Recall that the definition oj is
from the definition of XOS functions.
Lemma 3.2. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m](Aj + ∫ oj−Aj0 (1− Fj(x))dx).
Proof. Recall that Aj = maxxj≥0 {Fij(x)oj − xj}. We can bound bidder i’s utility in the Nash
equilibrium B by ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . To see this, consider the deviation for bidder i, where he bids
only for items in Oi, namely, for each item j, he bids the value xj that maximizes the expression
Fij(xj)oj−xj . Since for any obtained subset T ⊆ Oi, he has value vi(T ) ≥
∑
j∈T oj , and the bids xj
must be paid in any case, the expected utility with these bids is at least
∑
j∈Oi maxxj≥0 (Fij(x)oj−
xj) =
∑
j∈Oi Aj . With B being an equilibrium, we infer that ui(B) ≥
∑
j∈Oi Aj . By summing up
over all bidders,
SW (B) =
∑
i∈[n]
ui(B) +
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
E[bij ] ≥
∑
j∈[m]
Aj +
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
E[bij ]
≥
∑
j∈[m]
(Aj + E[max
i∈[n]
{bij}]) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(
Aj +
∫ oj−Aj
0
(1− Fj(x))dx
)
.
The first equality holds because
∑
i Eb[vi(b)] =
∑
i Eb[ui(b) +
∑
j∈[m] bij ]. The second inequality
follows because
∑
i bij ≥ maxi bij and the last one is implied by the definition of the expected value
of any positive random variable.
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3.2 Proof of Inequality (2)
Here, we prove the following lemma for any mixed Nash equilibrium B.
Lemma 3.3. SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx.
First we show a useful lemma that holds for XOS valuations. We will further use the technical
Proposition 3.5, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 3.4. For any fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuation function v,
v(S) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
(v(S)− v(S \ {j})) .
Proof. Let ξ be a maximizing additive function of S for the XOS valuation v. By definition, v(S) =
ξ(S) and for every j, v(S \ {j}) ≥ ξ(S \ {j}). Then, ∑j∈[m] (v(S)− v(S \ {j})) ≤ ∑j∈S(ξ(S) −
ξ(S \ {j})) = ∑j∈S ξ(j) = v(S).
Proposition 3.5. For any integer n ≥ 2, any positive reals Gi ≤ 1 and positive reals gi, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ n∏
i=1
Gi .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.3. We first state a proof sketch here to illustrate the main
ideas.
Sketch of Lemma 3.3. Recall that Gij is the CDF of the bid of player i for item j. For simplicity,
we assume Gij(x) is continuous and differentiable, with gij(x) being the PDF of player i’s bid for
item j. The general case will be considered later. First, we define the expected marginal valuation
of item j w.r.t player i,
vij(x)
def
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] .
Given the above definition and a careful characterization of mixed Nash equilibria, we are able to
show Fij(x) · vij(x) = E[vi(Xi(b)) − vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] and 1vij(x) =
dFij(x)
dx for any x in the
support of Gij . Let gij(x) be the derivative of Gij(x). Using Lemma 3.4, we have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))] ≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx ,
where the second inequality follows by the law of total probability. By using the facts that Fij(x) =∏
k 6=iGkj(x) and
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx , for any x > 0 such that gij(x) > 0 (x is in the support of player
i) and Fj(x) > 0, we obtain
Fij(x)·vij(x)·gij(x)=Fij(x)·gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x)·gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s 6=k∧s 6=iGsj
)= gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
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For every x > 0, we use Proposition 3.5 only over the set S of players with gij(x) > 0. After
summing over all bidders we get,∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈S
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈S
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈S
Gij(x) ≥
√
Fj(x) .
The above inequality also holds for Fj(x) = 0. Finally, by merging the above inequalities, we
conclude that SW (B) ≥∑j∈[m] ∫ oj−Aj0 √Fj(x)dx.
Now we show the complete proof for Lemma 3.3. Recall that oj is the contribution of item j to
the optimum social welfare. If player i is the one receiving item j in the optimum allocation, then
Aj = maxx≥0{Fij(x) · oj − x}. The proof of Lemma 3.3 needs a careful technical preparation that
we divided into a couple of lemmas.
First of all, we define the expected marginal valuation of item j for player i. For given mixed
strategy Bi, the distribution of bids on items in [m]\{j} depends on the bid bij , so one can consider
the given conditional expectation:
Definition 3.6. Given a mixed bidding profile B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn), the expected marginal valua-
tion vij(x) of item j for player i when bij = x is defined as
vij(x)
def
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] .
For a given B, let ϕij(x) denote the probability that bidder i gets item j when she bids x on
item j. It is clear that ϕij is non-decreasing and ϕij(x) ≤ Fij(x) (they are equal when no ties
occur).
Lemma 3.7. For a given B, for any bidder i, item j and bids x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0,
ϕij(y) · vij(x) = E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x] ,
where b′ is the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
Proof.
E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x]
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
+ E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j /∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j /∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)]Pr(j ∈ Xi(b′)|bij = x)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x, j ∈ Xi(b′)] · ϕij(y)
= E
b∼B
[vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j})|bij = x] · ϕij(y)
= ϕij(y) · vij(x) .
The second equality is due to Eb∼B[vi(Xi(b′)))−vi(Xi(b′)\{j})|bij = x, j /∈ Xi(b′)] = 0; the third
one holds because b′ij = y, and that other players’ bids have distribution ×k 6=iBk. The fourth one
is obvious, since Xi(b
′) = Xi(b′) ∪ {j} given that j ∈ Xi(b′). The last two equalities follow from
the fact that vi(Xi(b
′) ∪ {j})− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j}) is independent of the condition j ∈ Xi(b′) and of
the player i’s bid on item j.
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Definition 3.8. Given a Nash equilibrium B, we say a bid x is good for bidder i and item j (or
bij = x is good) if E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x], otherwise we say bij = x is bad.
Lemma 3.9. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and any item j, Pr[bij is bad ] = 0.
Proof. The lemma follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium; otherwise we can replace the
bad bids with good bids and improve the bidder’s utility.
Lemma 3.10. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j, good bid x and any bid y ≥ 0,
ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y .
Moreover, for a good bid x > 0, ϕij(x) > 0 holds.
Proof. Let b′ be the modified bid of b such that b′ = b except that b′ij = y.
E[ui(b)] = E[ui(b)|bij = x] ≥ E[ui(b′)|bij = x] .
Now we consider the difference between the above two terms:
0 ≤ E[ui(b)|bij = x]− E[ui(b′)|bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− bij |bij = x]− E[vi(Xi(b′))− b′ij |bij = x]
= E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x]
−E[vi(Xi(b′))− vi(Xi(b′) \ {j}|bij = x] + y − x
= (ϕij(x) · vij(x)− x)− (ϕij(y) · vij(x)− y) .
The second equality holds since Xi(b) \ {j} = Xi(b′) \ {j}; the third equality holds by Lemma 3.7.
Finally, ϕij(x) > 0 for positive good bids follows by taking y = 0, since with ϕij(x) = 0 the left
hand side of the inequality would be negative.
Next, by using the above lemma, we are able to show several structural results for Nash equi-
libria.
Definition 3.11. Given a mixed strategy profile B, we say that a positive bid x > 0 is in bidder
i’s support on item j, if for all ε > 0, Gij(x)−Gij(x− ε) > 0.
Lemma 3.12. Given a mixed strategy profile B, if a positive bid x is in bidder i’s support on item
j, then for every ε > 0, there exists x− ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is good.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there is an ε > 0 such that for all x′, such that x−ε < x′ ≤ x,
x′ is bad. Then Pr[bij is bad] ≥ Gij(x) − Gij(x − ε) > 0 (given that x is in the support), which
contradicts Lemma 3.9.
Lemma 3.13. Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is in bidder i’s support on item j, then there
must exist another bidder k 6= i such that x is also in the bidder k’s support on item j, i.e. for all
ε > 0, Gkj(x)−Gkj(x− ε) > 0.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that for each player k 6= i, there exists εk > 0 such that Gkj(x) −
Gkj(x − εk) = 0. Clearly, for ε = min{εk|k 6= i} it holds that Gkj(x) − Gkj(x − ε) = 0 for all
bidders k 6= i. That is ϕij(x) = ϕij(x− ε). By Lemma 3.12, there exists x− ε < x′ ≤ x such that
x′ is good for player i. Since ϕij is a non-decreasing function and ϕij(x) = ϕij(x − ε), we have
ϕij(x
′) = ϕij(x − ε). By Lemma 3.10, ϕij(x′) · vij(x′) − x′ ≥ ϕij(x − ε) · vij(x′) − x + ε which
contradicts the fact that ϕij(x
′) = ϕij(x− ε) and x′ > x− ε.
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Lemma 3.14. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for bidder i and item j, there are no x > 0 such that
Pr[bij = x] > 0, i.e. there are no mass points in the bidding strategy, except for possibly 0.
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists a bid x > 0 such that Pr[bij = x] > 0 for some
bidder i and item j. By Lemma 3.9, x is good for bidder i and item j, and ϕij(x) > 0 by Lemma
3.10.
According to Lemma 3.13, there must exist a bidder k such that x is in her support on item j.
We can pick a sufficiently small ε such that ε < (x− ε) ·ϕij(x) ·Pr[bij = x]. This can be done since
(x− ε) increases when ε decreases. Due to Lemma 3.12 there exists x− ε < x′ ≤ x such that x′ is
good for bidder k and item j. Now we consider the following two cases for x′.
Case 1: vkj(x
′) ≤ x′. Then ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′) − x′ ≤ ϕkj(x′) · x′ − x′ ≤ (1 − ϕij(x) · Pr[bij =
x]) ·x′−x′ < 0, contradicting Lemma 3.10. The first inequality holds by the case assumption. The
second holds because player k cannot get item j with bid x′ whenever player i gets it by bidding
x. The last inequality holds because both ϕij(x) > 0 and Pr[bij = x] > 0.
Case 2: vkj(x
′) > x′. Then there exists a sufficiently small ε′ such that ε′ ≤ (x − ε) · ϕij(x) ·
Pr[bij = x]− ε. So ε+ ε′ ≤ x′ · ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]. Then,
ϕkj(x+ ε
′) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
≥(ϕkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x]) · vkj(x′)− x− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − (x− x′)− ε′
>ϕkj(x
′) · vkj(x′) + ϕij(x) · Pr[bij = x] · x′ − x′ − ε− ε′
≥ϕkj(x′) · vkj(x′)− x′ ,
which contradicts Lemma 3.10. Here the first inequality holds because the probability that player
k gets the item with bid x + ε′ is at least the probablity that he gets it by bidding x′ plus the
probability that i bids x and gets the item (these two events for b−k are disjoint). The second
inequality holds by case assumption, and the rest hold by our assumptions on ε and ε′.
Lemma 3.15. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i and item j, ϕij(x) = Fij(x) for all
x > 0.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from Lemma 3.14. The probablity that some player k 6= i
bids exactly x is zero. Thus Fij(x) equals the probability that the highest bid of players other than
i is strictly smaller than x, and 1 − Fij(x) is the probability that it is strictly higher. Therefore
ϕij(x) = Fij(x).
Lemma 3.16. Given a Nash equilibrium B, for any bidder i, item j and good bids x1 > x2 > 0,
vij(x1) ≥ vij(x2).
Proof. By Lemma 3.10, we have (ϕij(x1) − ϕij(x2)) · vij(x1) ≥ x1 − x2 and (ϕij(x2) − ϕij(x1)) ·
vij(x2) ≥ x2 − x1. Combining these two inequalities, we have
1
vij(x1)
≤ ϕij(x1)− ϕij(x2)
x1 − x2 ≤
1
vij(x2)
.
Lemma 3.17. Given a Nash equilibrium B and item j, let T = sup{x|x is in some bidder’s support
on item j}. For any bid x < T , x is in some bidder’s support on item j.
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Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exist a bid x < T such that x is not in any bidder’s
support. Then there exists δ > 0 such that Gij(x) = Gij(x − δ) for all bidder i. Let y =
sup{z|∀i, Gij(x) = Gij(z)}. By Lemma 3.14, Gij is continuous. So we have Gij(y) = Gij(x) =
Gij(x− δ) for any bidder i. That is Fij(y) = Fij(x− δ) for any bidder i.
By the definition of supremum, there exits a bidder k such that for any ε > 0, Gkj(y + ε) >
Gkj(x) = Gkj(y). By Lemma 3.9, there exists a good bid y
+ ∈ (y, y + ε] for bidder k and item j.
We pick a sufficient small ε such that (Fkj(y
+)− Fkj(y)) · vkj(y+) < δ. This can be done since Fkj
is continuous by Lemma 3.14 and vkj is non-decreasing by Lemma 3.16.
Fkj(x− δ) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
=Fij(y) · vij(y+)− x+ δ
>Fij(y) · vij(y+)− y+ + δ
>Fij(y
+) · vij(y+)− y+ ,
which contradicts Lemma 3.10 and Lemma 3.15.
Lemma 3.18. Given a Nash equilibrium B, if x > 0 is a good bid for bidder i and item j, and Fij
is differentiable in x, then
1
vij(x)
=
dFij(x)
dx
.
Proof. Notice that vij(x) 6= 0 by Lemma 3.10. By Lemma 3.10 and 3.15, we have Fij(x)·vij(x)−x ≥
Fij(y) · vij(x)− y for all y ≥ 0. So for any ε > 0,
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x+ ε) · vij(x)− x− ε ,
Fij(x) · vij(x)− x ≥ Fij(x− ε) · vij(x)− x+ ε .
That is,
Fij(x+ ε)− Fij(x)
ε
≤ 1
vij(x)
,
Fij(x)− Fij(x− ε)
ε
≥ 1
vij(x)
.
The lemma follows by taking the limit when ε goes to 0.
of Lemma 3.3. Since Gij(x) is non-decreasing, continuous (Lemma 3.14) and bounded by 1, Gij(x)
is differentiable on almost all points. That is, the set of all non-differentiable points has Lebesgue
measure 0. So it will not change the value of integration if we remove these points. Therefore it is
without loss of generality to assume Gij(x) is differentiable for all x. Let gij(x) be the derivative
of Gij(x), i.e. probability density function for bidder i’s bidding on item j. Using Lemma 3.4, we
have
SW (B) =
∑
i
E[vi(Xi(b))]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})]
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
E[vi(Xi(b))− vi(Xi(b) \ {j})|bij = x] · gij(x)dx
≥
∑
i
∑
j
∫ oj−Aj
0
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x)dx .
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The second inequality follows by the law of total probability, and the third is due to Lemmas 3.7
and 3.15. By Lemma 3.18 and the fact that Fij(x) =
∏
k 6=iGkj(x), if x is good, gij(x) > 0 and
Gij(x) > 0 we have for all j
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =Fij(x) · gij(x)dFij
dx (x)
=
∏
k 6=iGkj(x) · gij(x)∑
k 6=i
(
gkj ·
∏
s 6=k∧s 6=iGsj
) = gij(x)∑
k 6=i
gkj(x)
Gkj(x)
.
By concentrating on a specific item j, let Sx be the set of bidders so that x is in their support.
We next show that |Sx| ≥ 2 for all x ∈ (0, oj − Aj ]. Recall that Aj = maxx {Fij(x) · oj − x} for
the bidder i who receives j in O. Let hij = min{x|Fij = 1} (we use minimum instead of infimum,
since, by Lemma 3.14, Fij is continuous). By definition hij should be in some bidder’s support.
Moreover, Aj ≥ Fij(hij) · oj − hij = oj − hij , resulting in oj − Aj ≤ hij . Therefore, by Lemma
3.17, for all x ∈ (0, oj − Aj ], x is in some bidder’s support and by Lemma 3.13, there are at least
2 bidders such that x is in their supports.
By the definition of derivative, for all i 6∈ Sx, gij(x) = 0. Similarly, we have gij(x) > 0 and
Gij(x) > 0 for all i ∈ Sx by definition 3.11. Moreover, for every i ∈ Sx, x is good for bidder i and
item j, since x is in their support. So, for any fixed x ∈ (0, oj −Aj ],
∑
i∈[n] Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) =∑
i∈Sx Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x), and according to Proposition 3.5,∑
i∈[n]
Fij(x) · vij(x) · gij(x) ≥
∑
i∈Sx
gij(x)∑
k 6=i,k∈Sx
gkj
Gkj
≥
√∏
i∈Sx
Gij(x) ≥
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x) .
Merging all these inequalities,
SW (B) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√∏
i∈[n]
Gij(x)dx =
∑
j∈[m]
∫ oj−Aj
0
√
Fj(x)dx .
3.3 Proof of Inequality (4)
In this section we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.19. For any CDF F and any real v > 0, R(F, v) ≥ 3+4λ−λ46 v.
In order to obtain a lower bound for R(F, v) as stated in the lemma, we show first that we
can restrict attention to cumulative distribution functions of a simple special form, since these
constitute worst cases for R(F, v). In the next lemma, for an arbitrary CDF F we will define a
simple piecewise linear function Fˆ that satisfies the following two properties:∫ v−A
0
(1− Fˆ (x))dx =
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx ;
∫ v−A
0
√
Fˆ (x)dx ≤
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx .
Once we establish this, it is convenient to lower bound R(Fˆ , v) for the given type of piecewise
linear functions Fˆ .
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Lemma 3.20. For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDF Fˆ such that
R(F, v) ≥ R(Fˆ , v) that, for A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x}, is defined by
Fˆ (x) =
{
0 , if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v , if x ∈ (x0, v −A] .
Proof. For any CDF F and real v > 0, there always exists another CDF Fˆ such that R(F, v) ≥
R(Fˆ , v) that, for A = maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x}, is defined by
Fˆ (x) =
{
0 , if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v ,if x ∈ (x0, v −A] .
First notice that maxx≥0{Fˆ (x) · v − x} = A. By the definition of Riemann integration, we can
represent the integration as the limit of Riemann sums. For any positive integer l, let Rl be the
Riemann sum if we partition the interval [0, v −A] into small intervals of size (v −A)/l. That is
Rl(F, v) = A+
v −A
l
·
(
l−1∑
i=0
(1− F (xi)) + λ ·
l−1∑
i=0
√
F (xi)
)
,
where xi =
i
l · (v −A). So we have R(F, v) = liml→∞Rl(F, v).
For any given l, let i∗ be the index such that
∑
i>i∗(xi +A)/v <
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi) and
∑
i>=i∗(xi +
A)/v ≥∑l−1i=0 F (xi). We define Fˆl as follows:
Fˆl(x) =

0 , if x < xi∗∑l−1
i=0 F (xi)−
∑
i>i∗(xi +A)/v if x ∈ [xi∗ , xi∗+1)
(x+A)/v , if x ∈ [xi∗+1, v −A] .
It is straight-forward to check that Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x), as described in the statement of the
lemma. We will show that for any l, Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v). Then the lemma follows by taking the
limit, since Rl(F, v) → R(F, v), and Rl(Fˆ , v) → R(Fˆ , v). Figure 1(a) illustrates Fˆ (x) (when we
take the limit of l to infinity).
By the construction of Fˆl, it is easy to check that
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi) =
∑l−1
i=0 Fˆl(xi) and maxx{Fˆl(x)·v−
x} = A. Then in order to prove Rl(F, v) ≥ Rl(Fˆl, v), it is sufficient to prove that
∑l−1
i=0
√
F (xi) ≥∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi). Let Q be the set of CDF functions such that ∀Q ∈ Q,
∑l−1
i=0Q(xi) =
∑l−1
i=0 F (xi)
and A = maxx≥0{Q(x) · v − x}, meaning further that Q(x) ≤ (x + A)/v, for all x ≥ 0. We will
show that Fˆl(x) has the minimum value for the expression
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi) within Q.
Assume on the contrary that some other functionQ ∈ Q has the minimum value for∑l−1i=0√Q(xi)
within Q and Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj) for some xj . Let i1 be the smallest index such that Q(xi1) > 0 and
i2 be the largest index such that Q(xi2) < (xi2 +A)/v. By the monotonicity of Q, we have i1 ≤ i2.
Due to the assumption that Q(xj) 6= Fˆl(xj) for some xj and
∑l−1
i=0
√
Q(xi) ≤
∑l−1
i=0
√
Fˆl(xi), we
get i1 6= i2. So i1 < i2 and Q(xi1) < Q(xi2) by the monotonicity of CDF functions. Now consider
another CDF function Q′ such that Q′(xi) = Q(xi) for all i 6= i1 ∧ i 6= i2, Q′(xi1) = Q(xi1)−  and
Q′(xi2) = Q(xi2) +  where  = min{Q(xi1), (xi2 +A)/v−Q(xi2)}. Figure 1(b) shows how we mod-
ify Q to Q′. It is easy to check Q′ ∈ Q and ∑l−1i=0√Q(xi) >∑l−1i=0√Q′(xi) which contradicts the
optimality of Q. The inequality holds because of
√
a+
√
b >
√
a− c+√b+ c for all 0 < c < a < b,
which can be proved by simple calculations.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Figure (a) illustrates Fˆ (x) = liml→∞ Fˆl(x) and figure (b) shows how Q′ is derived from
Q.
Now we are ready to proceed with the proof of Lemma 3.19.
of Lemma 3.19. By Lemma 3.20, for any fixed v > 0, we only need to consider the CDF’s in the
following form: for any positive A and x0 such that x0 +A ≤ v,
F (x) =
{
0 , if x ∈ [0, x0]
x+A
v , if x ∈ (x0, v −A] .
Clearly, maxx≥0{F (x) · v − x} = A. Let t = A+x0v . Then
R(F, v) = A+
∫ v−A
0
(1− F (x))dx+ λ ·
∫ v−A
0
√
F (x)dx
= A+ v −A− v
2
·
(
x+A
v
)2 ∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
+ λ · 2v
3
·
(
x+A
v
) 3
2
∣∣∣∣v−A
x0
= v − v
2
· (1− t2) + λ · 2v
3
· (1− t 32 ) = v ·
(
1
2
(1 + t2) +
2λ
3
(1− t 32 )
)
.
By optimizing over t, the above formula is minimized when t = λ2 ≤ 1. That is,
R(F, v) ≥ v ·
(
1
2
(1 + λ4) +
2λ
3
(1− λ3)
)
=
3 + 4λ− λ4
6
· v .
4 Multi-unit Auctions
In this section, we propose a randomized all-pay mechanism for the multi-unit setting, where m
identical items are to be allocated to n bidders. Markakis and Telelis [18] and de Keijzer et al. [9]
have studied the price of anarchy for several multi-unit auction formats. The current best upper
bound obtained was 1.58 for both pure and mixed Nash equilibria.
We propose a randomized all-pay mechanism that induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium, with
an improved price of anarchy bound of 4/3. We call the mechanism Random proportional-share
allocation mechanism (PSAM), as it is a randomized version of Kelly’s celebrated proportional-share
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Mechanism 1: Random PSAM
Input: Total number of items m and all bidders’ bid b1, b2, . . . , bn
Output: Ex-post allocations X1, X2, . . . , Xn and payments p1, p2, . . . , pn
if
∑
i∈[n] bi > 0 then
foreach bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
xi ← m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
;
pi ← bi;
Sample {Xi}i∈[n] from {xi}i∈[n] by using Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition theorem
such that bxic ≤ X ≤ dxie and the expectation of sampling Xi is xi;
else Set X = 0 and p = 0;
Return Xi and pi for all i ∈ [n];
allocation mechanism for divisible resources [15]. The mechanism works as follows (illustrated as
Mechanism 1).
Each bidder submits a non-negative real bi to the auctioneer. After soliciting all the bids from
the bidders, the auctioneer associates a real number xi with bidder i that is equal to xi =
m·bi∑
i∈[n] bi
.
Each player pays their bid, pi = bi. In the degenerate case, where
∑
i bi = 0, then xi = 0 and pi = 0
for all i.
We turn the xi’s to a random allocation as follows. Each bidder i secures bxic items and gets one
more item with probability xi − bxic. An application of the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition
theorem guarantees that given an allocation vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) with
∑
i xi = m, one can always
find a randomized allocation1 with random variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn such that E[Xi] = xi and
Pr[bxic ≤ Xi ≤ dxie] = 1 (see for example [11, 4]).
We next show that the game induced by the Random PSAM when the bidders have submodular
valuations is isomorphic to the game induced by Kelly’s mechanism for a single divisible resource
when bidders have piece-wise linear concave valuations. For convenience, we review the definition
of isomorphism between games as appears in Monderer and Shapley [19].
Definition 4.1. (Isomorphism [19]). Let Γ1 and Γ2 be games in strategic form with the same set
of players [n]. For k = 1, 2, let (Aik)i∈[n] be the strategy sets in Γk, and let (u
i
k)i∈[n] be the utility
functions in Γk. We say that Γ1 and Γ2 are isomorphic if there exists bijections φ
i : ai1 → ai2,
i ∈ [n] such that for every i ∈ [n] and every (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ ×i∈[n]Ai1,
ui1(a
1, a2, . . . , an) = ui2(φ
1(a1), φ2(a2), . . . , φn(an)) .
Theorem 4.2. Any game induced by the Random PSAM applied to the multi-unit setting with
submodular bidders is isomorphic to a game induced from Kelly’s mechanism applied to a single
divisible resource with piece-wise linear concave functions.
Proof. For each bidder i’s submodular valuation function fi : {0, 1, . . . ,m} → R+, we associate a
concave function gi : [0, 1]→ R+ such that,
∀x ∈ [0,m], gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)) . (5)
1As an example, assume x1 = 2.5, x2 = 1.6, x3 = 1.9. One can define a random allocation such that assignments
(3, 2, 1), (3, 1, 2) and (2, 2, 2) occur with probabilities 0.1, 0.4, and 0.5 respectively.
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Essentially, gi is the piecewise linear function that comprises the line segments that connect fi(k)
with fi(k+ 1), for all nonnegative integers k. It is easy to see that gi is concave if fi is submodular
(see also Fig. 4 for an illustration).
We use identity functions as the bijections φi of Definition 4.1. Therefore, it suffices to show
that, for any pure strategy profile b, ui(b) = u
′
i(b), where ui and u
′
i are the bidder i’s utility
functions in the first and second game, respectively. Let xi =
m·bi∑
i bi
, then
ui(b) = (xi − bxic)fi(bxic+ 1) + (1− xi + bxic)fi(bxic)− bi
= fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic)(fi(bxic+ 1)− fi(bxic))− bi
= gi
(xi
m
)
− bi = gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi = u′i(b) .
Note that gi
(
bi∑
i bi
)
− bi is player i’s utility, under b, in Kelly’s mechanism.
21 3 4 5 21 3 4 5
Figure 2: The left part of the figure depicts some submodular function f , while the right part
depicts the modified concave function g. One can verify that g is concave if f is submodular.
We next show an equivalence between the optimal welfares.
Lemma 4.3. The optimum social welfare in the multi-unit setting, with submodular valuations
f = (f1, . . . , fn), is equal to the optimal social welfare in the divisible resource allocation setting with
concave valuations g = (g1, . . . gn), where gi(x/m) = fi(bxc) + (x− bxc) · (fi(bxc+ 1)− fi(bxc)).
Proof. For any valuation profile v and (randomized) allocation A, we denote by SWv(A) the social
welfare of allocation A under the valuations v. For any fractional allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), such
that
∑
i xi = m, let X(x) = (X1(x), . . . , Xn(x)) be the random allocation as computed by the
Random PSAM given the fractional allocation x. Also let o = (o1, . . . , on) and O = (O1, . . . , On)
be the optimal allocations in the divisible resource allocation problem and in the multi-unit auction,
respectively.
First we show that SWg(o) ≥ SWf (O). Consider the fractional allocation o′ = (o′1, . . . , o′n),
where o′i = Oi/m, for every i. Then it is easy to see that for every i, gi(o
′
i) = fi(bOic)+(Oi−bOic) ·
(fi(bOic+1)−fi(bOic)) = fi(Oi), since Oi is an integer. Therefore, SWg(o) ≥ SWg(o′) = SWf (O),
by the optimality of o.
Now we show SWf (O) ≥ SWg(o). Note that for any fractional allocation x, such that
∑
j xj =
m, EX(x)[fi(Xi(x))] = fi(bxic) + (xi − bxic) · (fi(bxic + 1) − fi(bxic)) = gi(xi/m), for every i. By
the optimality of O, SWf (O) ≥ EX(m·o)[SWf (X(m · o))] = SWg(o).
Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, allow us to obtain the existence and uniqueness of the pure Nash
equilibrium, as well as the price of anarchy bounds of Random PSAM by the corresponing results
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on Kelly’s mechanism for a single divisible resource [14]. Moreover, it can be shown that there
are no other mixed equilibria by adopting the arguments of [5] for Kelly’s mechanism. The main
conclusion of this section is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Random PSAM induces a unique pure Nash equilibrium when applied to the multi-
unit setting with submodular bidders. Moreover, the price of anarchy of the mechanism is exactly
4/3.
5 Single item auctions
In this section, we study mixed Nash equilibria in the single item all-pay auction. First, we measure
the inefficiency of mixed Nash equilibria, showing tight results for the price of anarchy. En route,
we also show that the price of anarchy is 8/7 for two players. Then we analyze the quality of two
other important criteria, the expected revenue (the sum of bids) and the quality of the expected
highest submission (the maximum bid), which is a standard objective in crowdsourcing contests [6].
For these objectives, we show a tight lower bound of v2/2, where v2 is the second highest value
among all bidders’ valuations. In the following, we drop the word expected while referring to the
revenue or to the maximum bid.
We quantify the loss of revenue and the highest submission in the worst-case equilibria. We show
that the all-pay auction achieves a 2-approximation comparing to the conventional procurement
(modeled as the first price auction), when considering worst-case mixed Nash equilibria; we show in
Appendix B that the revenue and the maximum bid of the conventional procurement equals v2 in
the worst case. We also consider other structures of rewards allocation and conclude that allocating
the entire reward to the highest bidder is the only way to guarantee the approximation factor of
2. Roughly speaking, allocating all the reward to the top prize is the optimal way to maximize the
maximum bid and revenue among all the prior-free all-pay mechanisms where the designer has no
prior information about the participants. Throughout this section we assume that the players are
ordered based on decreasing order of their valuations, i.e. v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. We also drop the
word expected when referring to the revenue or to the maximum bid.
Theorem 5.1. The mixed price of anarchy of the single item all-pay auction is 1.185.
Proof. Upper bound: Based on the results of [1], inefficient Nash equilibria only exist when
players’ valuations are in the form v1 > v2 = ... = vk > vk+1 ≥ ... ≥ vn (with v2 > 0), where players
k + 1 through n bid zero with probability 1. W.l.o.g., we assume that v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0,
for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Let P1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets the item in any such mixed Nash
equilibrium denoted by B. Then the expected utility of bidder 1 in b ∼ B can be expressed by
E[u1(b)] = P1 · 1 − E[b1]. Based on the characterization in [1], no player would bid above v in
any Nash equilibrium and nobody bids exactly v with positive probability. Therefore, if player 1
deviates to v, she will gets the item with probability 1. By the definition of Nash equilibrium, we
have E[u1(b)] ≥ E[u1(v,b−i)] = 1− v, resulting in P1 ≥ 1− v + E[b1].
It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2C in [1], that E[b1] is minimized when players 2
through k play symmetric strategies. Following their results, we can extract the following equations
(for a specific player i):
G1(x) =
x
v
∏
i′ 6=1,iGi′(x)
, ∀x ∈ (0, v] ;
∏
i′ 6=1
Gi′(x) = 1− v + x, ∀x ∈ (0, v] .
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Recall that Gi′(x) is the CDF according to which player i
′ bids in B. Since players 2 through k
play symmetric strategies, Gi′(x) should be identical for i
′ 6= 1. Then, for some i′ 6= 1,
G1(x) =
x
v ·Gk−2i′ (x)
=
x
v · (1− v + x) k−2k−1
, ∀x ∈ (0, v] .
Note that 1− v + x ≤ 1, and so we get G1(x) ≤ xv(1−v+x) (for two players, G1(x) = xv ) and
E[b1] ≥
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v (1− v + x)
)
dx = v − 1− (1− v) ln(1− v)
v
.
Now we can derive that P1 ≥ 1−vv ln 11−v .
For two players, E[b1] =
∫ v
0 (1− x/v) dx = v/2 and so P1 = 1− v/2.
The expected social welfare in B is E[SW (b)] ≥ P1 + (1 − P1)v ≥ (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v + v. The
expression, T (v) = (1−v)
2
v ln
1
1−v +v, is minimized for v ≈ 0.5694 and therefore, the price of anarchy
is at most T (0.5694) ≈ 1.185. Particularly, for two players, E[SW (b)] ≥ 1 − v/2 + v2/2, which is
minimized for v = 1/2 and therefore the price of anarchy for two players is at most 8/7.
Lower bound: Consider n players, with valuations v1 = 1 and vi = v > 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Let
B be the Nash equilibrium, where bidders bid according to the following CDFs,
G1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)n−2n−1
x ∈ [0, v] ; Gi(x) = (1− v + x)
1
n−1 x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1 .
Note that Fi(x) =
∏
i′ 6=iGi′(x) is the probability of bidder i getting the item when she bids x, for
every bidder i.
F1(x) = (1− v + x) x ∈ [0, v] ; Fi(x) = x
v
x ∈ [0, v], i 6= 1 .
If player 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is u1 = F1(x) · 1 − x = 1 − v. Bidding greater
than v is dominated by bidding v. If any player i 6= 1 bids any value x ∈ [0, v], her utility is
ui = Fi(x) · v − x = 0. Bidding greater than v results in negative utility. Hence, B is a Nash
equilibrium. Let P1 be the probability that bidder 1 gets the item in B, then
E[SW (b)] = 1 · P1 + (1− P1)v = v + (1− v)P1 = v + (1− v)
∫ v
0
Gn−1i (x)dG1(x) .
When n goes to infinity, E[SW (b)] converges to v+ (1− v) ∫ v0 1−vv(1−v+x)dx = v+ (1− v)1−vv ln 11−v =
(1−v)2
v ln
1
1−v + v = T (v). If we set v = 0.5694, the price of anarchy is at least T (v) ≈ 1.185.
For n = 2, E[SW (b)] = v + (1 − v) ∫ v0 1−v+xv = v + (1 − v)(1 − v/2) = 1 − v/2 + v2/2, which for
v = 1/2 results in price of anarchy at least 8/7.
Theorem 5.2. In any mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item all-pay auction, the revenue and
the maximum bid are at least half of the second highest valuation.
Proof. Let k be any integer greater or equal to 2, such that v1 ≥ v2 = . . . = vk ≥ vk+1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn.
Let F (x) =
∏
iGi(x) be the CDF of the maximum bid h. By the characterization of [1], in
any mixed Nash equilibrium, players with valuation less than v2 do not participate (always bid
zero) and there exist two players 1, i bidding continuously in the interval [0, v2]. Then, by [1],
F1 = (v1 − v2 + x)/v1 and Fi(x) = x/v2, for any x ∈ (0, v2]. Therefore, we get
F (x) = Fi(x)Gi(x) =
x
v2
Gi(x) .
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In the proof of Theorem 2C in [1], it is argued that Gi1(x) is maximized (and therefore the
maximum bid is minimized) when all the k players play symmetrically (except for the first player,
in the case that v1 > v2). So, F (x) is maximized for Gi =
(∏
i′ 6=1Gi′
) 1
k−1
= F
1
k−1
1 =
(
v1−v2+x
v1
) 1
k−1
.
Finally we get
E[h] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (x))dx ≥
∫ v2
0
(
1− x
v2
(
v1 − v2 + x
v1
) 1
k−1
)
dx
≥ v2 −
∫ v2
0
x
v2
dx =
1
2
v2 .
The same lower bound also holds for the revenue, which is at least as high as the maximum
bid. This lower bound is tight for the maximum bid, as indicated by our analysis, when k goes
to infinity and for the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium. In the next lemma, we show that this
lower bound is also tight for the revenue.
Lemma 5.3. For any  > 0, there exists a valuation vector v = (v1, . . . , vn), such that in a mixed
Nash equilibrium of the induced single-item all-pay auction, the revenue and the maximum bid is
at most v2/2 + .
Proof. In [1], the authors provide results for the revenue in all possible equilibria. For the case
that v1 = v2, the revenue is always equal to v2. To show a tight lower bound, we consider the case
where v1 > v2 and there exist k players with valuation v2 playing symmetrically in the equilibrium,
by letting k go to infinity. For this case, based on [1], the revenue is equal to2∑
i
E[bi] = v2 + (1− v)E[b1] ,
where E[b1] =
∫ v
0 (1−G1(x)) dx. From the proof of Theorem 5.2 we can derive that G1(x) =
F (x)/F1(x) =
x
v (1− v + x)
1
k−1−1 = xv (1− v + x)−1, when k goes to infinity. By substituting we
get, ∑
i
E[bi] = v2 + (1− v)
∫ v
0
(
1− x
v
(1− v + x)−1
)
dx
= v2 + (1− v)
(
v − 1
v
(v + (1− v) ln(1− v))
)
= 2v − 1− (1− v)
2
v
ln(1− v)
= v − (1− v)
(
1 +
1− v
v
ln(1− v)
)
.
By taking limits, we finally derive that limv→0
(∑
i E[bi]
v
)
= 1/2. The same tightness result also
holds for the maximum bid, which is at most the same as the revenue.
Finally, the next theorem indicates that allocating the entire reward to the highest bidder is
the best choice. In particular a prior-free all-pay mechanism is presented by a probability vector
q = (qi)i∈[n], with
∑
i∈[n] qi = 1, where qi is the probability that the i
th highest bidder is allocated
the item, for every i ≤ n.
2For simplicity we assume v1 = 1 and v2 = v.
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Theorem 5.4. For any prior-free all-pay mechanism that assigns the item to the highest bidder
with probability strictly less than 1, i.e. q1 < 1, there exists a valuation profile and mixed Nash
equilibrium such that the revenue and the maximum bid are strictly less than v2/2.
Proof. We will assert the statement of the theorem for the valuation profile (1, v, 0, 0, . . . , 0), where
v ∈ (0, 1) is the second highest value. It is safe to assume that q2 ∈ [0, q1) 3. We show that the
following bidding profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium. The first two bidders bid on the interval
[0, v(q1 − q2)] and the other bidders bid 0. The CDF of bidder 1’s bid is G1(x) = xv(q1−q2) and the
CDF of bidder 2’s bid is G2(x) = x/(q1 − q2) + 1− v. It can be checked that this is a mixed Nash
equilibrium by the following calculations. For every bid x ∈ [0, v(q1 − q2)],
u1(x) = G2(x) · q1 + (1−G2(x)) · q2 − x = q1 − v(q1 − q2) ,
u2(x) = G1(x) · q1v + (1−G1(x)) · q2v − x = q2v .
The revenue is∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G1(x))dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(1−G2(x))dx
=
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1− x
v(q1 − q2)
)
dx+
∫ v(q1−q2)
0
(
1−
(
x
q1 − q2 + 1− v
))
dx
=
v(q1 − q2)
2
+
v2(q1 − q2)
2
.
When v goes to 0, the revenue go to v(q1 − q2)/2 < v/2 since q1 − q2 < 1. Obviously, the same
happens with the maximum bid, which is at most the same as the revenue.
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A Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proposition 3.5 (restated). For any integer n ≥ 2, any positive real Gi ≤ 1 and positive real
gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
gi∑
k 6=i
gk
Gk
≥
√√√√ n∏
i=1
Gi .
In order to prove the proposition, we will minimize the left hand side of the inequality over all
Gi and gi, such that
0 < Gi ≤ 1 gi > 0 (i ∈ [n]) where
n∏
t=1
Gt is a constant . (6)
We introduce the following notation:
H =
n∑
i=1
gi∑n
t=1,t6=i
gt
Gt
and ∀i, Hi = gi∑n
t=1,t6=i
gt
Gt
.
Note that H =
∑n
i=1Hi. Our goal is to minimize H over all possible variables Gi and gi under
the constraints (6), and eventually show H ≥ √∏ni=1Gi. We also use the notation G = (Gi)i,
g = (gi)i, H = H(G,g) and Hi = Hi(G,g), ∀i.
Lemma A.1. For every G and g that minimize H(·, ·) under constraints (6):
1. If Gi < 1 and Gj < 1, then Hi = Hj ,
2. If Gi = Gj = 1 then gi = gj.
We prove Lemma A.1, by proving Lemmas A.2 and A.3.
Lemma A.2. Under constraints (6), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every Gi < 1 and
Gj < 1, Hi(G,g) = Hj(G,g).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi < 1 and Gj < 1 such that (w.l.o.g.)
Hi(G,g) > Hj(G,g). Let
r = min
{(
Hi(G,g)
Hj(G,g)
) 1
2
,
1
Gj
}
.
Notice that r > 1.
Claim: We claim thatH(G,g) > H(G′,g′), where G′ = (Gir , rGj ,G−ij) and g
′ = (gir , rgj ,g−ij).
As usual G−ij stands for G vector after eliminating Gi and Gj (accordingly for g−ij). Therefore
G′ and g′ are the same as G and g by replacing Gi, Gj , gi, gj by Gir , rGj ,
gi
r , rgj , respectively.
Proof of the claim: Notice that
g′i
G′i
=
gi/r
Gi/r
=
gi
Gi
,
g′j
G′j
=
rgj
rGj
=
gj
Gj
and ∀s 6= i, j, G′s = Gs and g′s = gs .
Therefore, ∀s 6= i, j, Hs(G,g) = Hs(G′,g′). So, we only need to show that Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g) >
Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′).
21
Hi(G
′,g′) +Hj(G′,g′)
=
g′i(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=i
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
+
g′j(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=j
g′t(x)
G′t(x)
=
gi(x)/r∑n
t=1,t 6=i
gt(x)
Gt(x)
+
rgj(x)∑n
t=1,t 6=j
gt(x)
Gt(x)
=
Hi(G,g)
r
+ rHj(G,g)
=
(
1
r
− 1
)
Hi(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
≤
(
1
r
− 1
)
r2Hj(G,g) + (r − 1)Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
= − (r − 1)2Hj(G,g) +Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)
< Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g) .
In the above inequalities we used that r > 1 and r2 ≤ Hi(G,g)Hj(G,g) . The claim contradicts the
assumption that H(G,g) is the minimum, so the lemma holds.
Lemma A.3. Under constraints (6), if G and g minimize H(·, ·), then for every Gi = Gj = 1,
gi = gj .
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exist Gi = Gj = 1 such that gi 6= gj . We
will prove that for g′ = (gi+gj2 ,
gi+gj
2 , g−ij) (i.e. for every k 6= i, j, g′k = gk, and g′i = g′j =
gi+gj
2 ),
H(G,g) > H(G,g′).
Notice that for every k 6= i, j, Hk(G,g′) = Hk(G,g), since gi + gj = g′i + g′j and Gi = Gj = 1.
Hence it is sufficient to show that Hi(G,g) + Hj(G,g) ≥ Hi(G,g′) + Hj(G,g′). Let Aij =∑
t6=j,t6=i
gt
Gt
.
Hi(G,g) +Hj(G,g)−Hi(G,g′)−Hj(G,g′)
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− gigi+gj
2 +Aij
− gjgi+gj
2 +Aij
=
gi
gj +Aij
+
gj
gi +Aij
− 2gi + 2gj
gi + gj + 2Aij
= gi
(gi +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gj +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
+ gj
(gj +Aij)((gi + gj + 2Aij)− 2(gi +Aij))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
gi(gi +Aij)(gi − gj) + gj(gj +Aij)(gj − gi)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)(g2i − g2j +Aij(gi − gj))
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
=
(gi − gj)2(gi + gj +Aij)
(gj +Aij)(gi +Aij)(gi + gj + 2Aij)
> 0 ,
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which contradicts the assumption that G and g minimize H(·, ·).
Lemma A.4. If Hi = Hj, then:
1. gi = gj ⇔ Gi = Gj,
2. (gi = rgj > 0 and r ≥ 1)⇒ Gi ≥ r2Gj.
Proof. Let Aij =
∑
t6=j,t6=i
gt
Gt
; then Hi =
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
. By assumption:
gi
gj
Gj
+Aij
=
gj
gi
Gi
+Aij
g2i
Gi
+ giAij =
g2j
Gj
+ gjAij
(gi − gj)Aij =
g2j
Gj
− g
2
i
Gi
.
If gi = gj then
1
Gj
− 1Gi = 0, so Gi = Gj .
If Gi = Gj then (gi − gj)(gi + gj +AijGi) = 0 . Under constraints (6), AijGi > 0 and gi, gj > 0, so
gi − gj = 0 which results in gi = gj .
If gi = rgj , with r ≥ 1 then (gi − gj)Aij ≥ 0 and so 1Gj − r
2
Gi
≥ 0, which implies Gi ≥ r2Gj .
Lemma A.5. For n, k integers, n ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0:
L =
kg
(k − 1) ga + n− k
+
n− k
k ga + n− k − 1
≥ a .
Proof. We distinguish between two cases, 1) k > 1
1−√a and 2) k ≤ 11−√a .
Case 1 (k > 1
1−√a): For k = n, L =
k
k−1a ≥ a. We next show that dLdg ≤ 0, for n ≥ 2, 1 ≤ k < n,
0 < a ≤ 1 and g > 0.
dL
dg
=
(n− k)k(
(k−1)g
a + n− k
)2 − (n− k)k(
kg
a + n− k − 1
)2
a
≤ 0
(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k
)2
−
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)2
a ≥ 0(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k +
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)
a
1
2
)
·
(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k −
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)
a
1
2
)
≥ 0(
(k − 1)g
a
+ n− k −
(
kg
a
+ n− k − 1
)
a
1
2
)
≥ 0(g
a
(
k − 1− ka 12
)
+ (n− k)
(
1− a 12
)
+ a
1
2
)
≥ 0
k − 1− ka 12 ≥ 0 ,
which is true by the case assumption. Therefore, L is non-increasing and so it is minimized for
g =∞. Hence, L ≥ kk−1a ≥ a.
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Case 2 (k ≤ 1
1−√a): L is minimized (dL/dg(g
∗) = 0) for g∗ = a(
√
a+(n−k)(1−√a))
k
√
a−k+1 , therefore:
L ≥
k2 (1−√a)2 + k
(
a− n (1−√a)2 − 1
)
+ n)
(n− 1) ,
which is minimizes for k = n2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) . However, for n ≥ 2,
n
2 +
(1+
√
a)
2(1−√a) ≥
1
1−√a . Notice, though,
that for k ≤ 1
1−√a , L is decreasing, so it is minimized for k =
1
1−√a . Therefore, L ≥
√
a ≥ a.
Proof. (Proposition 3.5)
Let G and g minimize H(·, ·) and also let S = {i|Gi < 1} and F =
∏n
t=1Gt. Moreover, given
Lemma A.1, for gi = gˆ for every i /∈ S and j = arg mini∈S gi, H(G,g) can be written as:
H(G,g) = |S| gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S|)gˆ + (n− |S|)
gˆ∑
t∈S
gt
Gt
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let gi = rigj , for every i ∈ S. Since j = arg mini∈S gi, then for every i ∈ S, ri ≥ 1. By using
Lemma A.4:
H(G,g) =
|S| · gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S|)gˆ +
(n− |S|) · gˆ∑
t∈S
rtgj
G
1
2
t G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
≥ |S| · gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
rtgj
(r2tGj)
1
2G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S|)gˆ +
(n− |S|) · gˆ∑
t∈S
rtgj
(r2tGj)
1
2G
1
2
t
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
≥ |S| · gj∑
t∈S,t6=j
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ +
(n− |S|) · gˆ∑
t∈S
gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ
=
|S| · gj
(|S| − 1) gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S|)gˆ +
(n− |S|) · gˆ
|S| gj
F
1
2
+ (n− |S| − 1)gˆ .
Let g =
gj
gˆ , then:
H(G,g) ≥ |S| · g
(|S| − 1) g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| +
n− |S|
|S| g
F
1
2
+ n− |S| − 1 .
If |S| = 0, H(G,g) ≥ nn−1 ≥ 1 ≥
√
F . Else, due to Lemma A.5, H(G,g) ≥ √F .
B Conventional Procurement
In this section we give bounds on the expected revenue and maximum bid of the single-item first-
price auction. In the following, we drop the word expected when referring to the revenue or to the
maximum bid.
Theorem B.1. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, the revenue and the maximum bid lie between the
two highest valuations. There further exists a tie-breaking rule, such that in the worst-case, these
quantities match the second highest valuation (This can also be achieved, under the no-overbidding
assumption).
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Lemma B.2. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if the expected utility of any player i with valuation
vi is 0, then with probability 1 the maximum bid is at least vi.
Proof. Consider any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and let h = maxi{bi} be the highest bid; h
is a random variable induced by B. For the sake of contradiction, assume that h is strictly less
than vi with probability p > 0. Then, there exists ε > 0 such that h < vi − ε with probability p.
Consider now the deviation of player i to pure strategy si = vi − ε. si would be the maximum bid
with probability p and therefore the utility of player i would be at least p(vi− (vi− ε)) = p · ε > 0.
This contradicts the fact that B is an equilibrium and completes the proof of lemma.
Lemma B.3. In any mixed Nash equilibrium, if v is the highest valuation, any player with valuation
strictly less than v has expected utility equal to 0.
Proof. In [8] (Theorem 5.4), they proved that the price of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria, for
the single-item first-price auction, is exactly 1. This means that the player(s) with the highest
valuation gets the item with probability 1. Therefore, any player with valuation strictly less than
v gets the item with zero probability and hence, her expected utility is 0.
Consider the players ordered based on their valuations so that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. In
order to prove Theorem B.1, we distinguish between two cases: i) v1 > v2 and ii) v1 = v2.
Lemma B.4. If v1 > v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, is at least v2 and at
most v1. If we further assume no-overbidding, the maximum bid is exactly v2.
Proof. If v1 > v2, by Lemma B.3, the expected utility of player 2 equals 0. From Lemma B.2, the
highest bid is at least v2 with probability 1. Moreover, if there exist players bidding above v1 with
positive probability, then at least one of them (whoever gets the item with positive probability)
would have negative utility for that bid and would prefer to deviate to 0; so, the bidding profile
couldn’t be an equilibrium. Therefore, the maximum bid lies between v1 and v2.
If we further assume no-overbidding, nobody, apart from player 1, would bid above v2. So, the
same hold for player 1, who has an incentive to bid arbitrarily close to v2.
Corollary B.5. If v1 > v2, there exists a tie breaking rule, under which the maximum bid of the
worst-case mixed Nash equilibrium is exactly v2.
Proof. Due to Lemma B.4, it is sufficient to show a tie breaking rule, where there exists a mixed
Nash equilibrium with highest bid equal to v2. Consider the tie-breaking rule where, in a case of
a tie with player 1 (the bidder of the highest valuation), the item is always allocated to player 1.
Under this tie-breaking rule, the pure strategy profile, where everybody bids v2 is obviously a pure
Nash equilibrium, with v2 being the maximum bid.
Lemma B.6. If v1 = v2, the maximum bid of any mixed Nash equilibrium, equals v2.
Proof. Consider a set S of k ≥ 2 players having the same valuation v1 = v2 = . . . = vk = v and the
rest having a valuation strictly less than v. For any mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ B and any player
i, let Gi and Fi be the CDFs of bi and maxi′ 6=i bi′ , respectively. We define li = inf{x|Gi(x) > 0} to
be the infimum value of player’s i support in B. We would like to prove that maxi li = v. For the
sake of contradiction, assume that maxi li < v (Assumption 1).
We next prove that, under Assumption 1, li = l for any player i ∈ S and for some 0 ≤ l < v. We
will assume that lj < li for some players i, j ∈ S (Assumption 2) and we will show that Assumption
2 contradicts Assumption 1. There exists ε > 0 such that lj + ε < li. Moreover, based on the
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definition of lj , for any ε
′ > 0, Gj(lj + ε′) > 0 and so Gj(lj + ε) > 0. When player’s j bid is derived
by the interval [lj , lj + ε], she receives the item with zero probability, since li > lj + ε. Therefore,
for any bid of her support that is at most lj + ε, her utility is zero (Gj(lj + ε) > 0, so there should
be such a bid). Since B is a mixed Nash equilibrium, her total expected utility should also be zero.
In that case, Lemma B.2 contradicts Assumption 1, and therefore Assumption 2 cannot be true
(under Assumption 1). Thus, for any player i ∈ S, li = l for some 0 ≤ l < v.
Moreover, Lemma B.3 indicates that no player i /∈ S bids above l with positive probability, i.e.
Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. We now show that for any i ∈ S, Gi cannot have a mass point at l, i.e.
Gi(l) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Case 1. If Gi(l) > 0 for all i, then p =
∏
iGi(l) > 0 is the probability that the highest bid is l,
or more precisely, it is the probability that all players in S bid l and a tie occurs. Given that this
event occurs, there exists a player j ∈ S that gets the item with probability pj strictly less than
1 (this is the conditional probability). Therefore, player j has an incentive to deviate from l to
l+ ε, for ε < (1− pj)(v − l) (so that pj(v − l) < v − (l+ ε)); this contradicts the fact that B is an
equilibrium.
Case 2. If Gi(l) > 0 and Gj(l) = 0 for some i, j ∈ S, then l is in the support of player i, but
she does never receives the item when she bids l, since player j bids above l with probability 1.
Therefore, the expected utility of player i is 0 and due to Lemma B.2 this cannot happen under
Assumption 1.
Overall, we have proved so far that, under Assumption 1 (that now has become l < v), Gi(l) = 0
for all i ∈ S and Gi(l) = 1 for all i /∈ S. Since k ≥ 2, Fi(l) =
∏
i′ 6=iGi′(l) = 0 for all i.
Consider any player i ∈ S and let ui be her expected utility. Based on the definition of li, for
any ε > 0, there exists x(ε) ∈ [l, l + ε], such that x(ε) is in the support of player i. Therefore,
ui ≤ Fi(x(ε))(v − x(ε)) ≤ Fi(l + ε)(v − l). As Fi is a CDF, it should be right-continuous and so
for any δ > 0, there exists some ε > 0, such that Fi(l + ε)(v − l) < δ and therefore, ui < δ. We
can contradict Assumption 1, right away by using Lemma B.2, but we give a bit more explanation.
Assume that, in B, the maximum bid h is strictly less than v with probability p > 0. Then, there
exists some ε′ > 0, such that h < v − ε′ with probability p. If we consider any δ < p(v − ε′),
it is straight forward to see that player i has an incentive to deviate to the pure strategy v − ε′.
Therefore, we showed that Assumption 1 cannot hold and so the highest bid is at least v with
probability 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma B.4, nobody will bid above v in any mixed Nash
equilibrium.
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